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CAloIODECA.

[Crim. No. 6412. In Bank.

[52 C.2d

May 12,1959.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANK CAMODECA,
Appellant.
[1] Oriminal Law-Attempt to Oommit Orime.-In order to establish an attempt, it must appear that defendant had a specific
intent to commit a crime and did a direct. unequivocal act
toward that end.
[2] ld.-Attempt to Oommit Orime.-Preparation alone is not
enough to constitute an attempt to commit a crime; there
must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed,
and it must be in such progress that it will be conswnmated
unless interrupted by circumstances independent of the will of
the attempter.
[3] False Pretenses - Attempt - Evidence.-Defendant's admismissions to the police that he tried to get $720 from the purchaser of a bar by falsely representing that he could get
alleged violations against the bar "fixed" and that the money
was to be for his own use established specific intent to obtain
money by false pretenses (Pen. Code, § 484) and thus sustained a conviction of attempted grand theft, his conduct in
seeking to accomplish that objective going well past the stage
of mere preparation.
[4] ld.-Attempt-Overt Act.-Defendant's act of meeting the
purchaser of a bar for the purpose of obtaining money he had
previously falsely represented was necessary to "fix" alleged
violations constituted an unequivocal act done toward the
commission of grand theft and was sufficient to sustain a conviction of attempted grand theft.
[5a, 5b] ld.-Attempt-Deception of Intended Victim.-The fact
that the purchaser of a bar, who was deceived at the time defendant falsely represented that on payment of a designated
sum he could get alleged violations "fixed," was no longer
deceived at the time defendant later met him for the purpose
of obtaining the money did not prevent conviction of attempted grand theft by false pretenses, since there was not a
legal but only a factual impossibility of consummating the
intended offense, i.e., the intended victim was not deceived.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 30, 31; Am.Jur., Criminal
Law, § 65 et seq.
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Theft, § 88; Am.Jur., Falsc Pretenses, § 80.
McE:. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8, 9] Criminal Law, § 44; [3-6]
False Pretenses, § 18; [7] Criminal Law, § 1; [10] Extortion, § 15;
[11] Criminal Law, § 141.
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(Overruling rC(Jplc v. Wt'rlll'r, 16 Ca1.2d 216, 225 [105 P.2d
927], :md People v. Schroeder, 132 CaL\pp.2d 1, 6-8 [281
P.2d 297], to the cxtt'nt thnt tht'y hold that d;:oct'ption of the
. intendt'd \'ictim !lnd his rcliancc on the false l'f'p1'C"';f'lItlltinm;
arc E'sscntial elcmC'nts (If the (lfi't'nse of nttt'mptc<1 ;1';'11<1 thC'ft
by false prt'tensE's.)
[6] Id.-Att~mpt-Deception of Intended Victim.-In Il. prosecution for attempted grand theft by false pretenses it is not
necessary that defendant's intended victim be deceived by
the falsity of the representations made to him.
[7] Criminal Law-Purpose of Law.-One of the purposes of the
criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to
injure it.
[8] Id.-Attempts to Commit Crime.-When it is established that
defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that ill
carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused
harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immat~rial that for
some collateral reason he could not complete the intended
crime.
[9] Id.-Attempts to Commit Crime.-Although the law does not
impose punishment for guilty intent alone, it does impose
punishment when guilty intent is coupled with action that
would result in a crime but for the intervention of some fact
or circumstance unknown to the defendant.
[10] Extortion - Attempt - Evidence.-Statements by defend-;;;t
to the purchaser of a bar thnt "the old man" had paid the
$720 sought from the purchaser to "fix" alleged violations and
that there would have to be reimbursement "or else" raised
the reasonable inference that defendant intended to secure
money from the purchaser by threatening to procure the
revocation of his license or otherwise interfere with his busiiness by unlawful means, supported an implied finding that
defendant attempted to place the purchaser in fear of unlawful
injury to his business or his person if the money was not paid,
and sustained a conviction of attempted extortion. (Pen.
Code, §§ 519, 524.)
[11] Criminal Law - Former Jeopa.rdy - Identity of -Offenses.Where defendant first tried to get $720 from the purchaser of
a bar by falsely representing that certain charges on file
against his business could be "fi.'{ed" with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and he met with the purchaser to collect
the bribe money, such conduct constituted an attempted grand
theft by false pretenses, and where later, after realizing that
he was going to encounter difficulty in securing such sum from
the purchaser, he attenlpted to extort the mOlley from the
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Extortion and Blaekumil, § 21.
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pw:chaser by veiled threats of injury to his person or business,
this was a separate and distinct crime, and defendant's conviction of both crimes, with concurrent sentences, was proper,
this not being a ease where but one punishment for one
criminal act can be inHicted.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. S. Victor Wagler, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for attempts to commit grand theft and extortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Robert H. Kroninger for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General,
Clarence A. Linn, Chief Assistant Attorney General, John S.
McInerny, Deputy Attorney General, J. F. Coakley, District
Attorney (Alameda), and C. Zook Sutton, Deputy District
Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant held a contract of sale and collected the monthly payments on a bar owned and operated by
William L. Murphy. On June 15, 1957, Murphy discussed
with defendant the possibility of removing the name of Murphy's "common-law wife" from the contract of sale and from
the bar's beer and wine license. Defendant stated that this
could be done but that it would require a "fix." He also told
Murphy that the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
had certain charges on file against the bar and that those
charges could be fixed and the license cleared if Murphy would
give defendant $720 to pass on to certain persons in Sacramento. There were no reported violations in fact, but Murphy
believed the misrepresentations and attempted to raise the
money. When he was unable to do so he brought the matter
to the attention of the district attorney. A meeting between
Murphy and defendant was arranged for June 18th, when
defendant was to receive the money. By arrangement with
Murphy, police officers were hidden near the place of the
second meeting, and the conversation was recorded'. On learning that Murphy was unable to raise the money, defendant
stated that the money had already been paid to the officials in
Sacramento by an unnamed man who would be "unhappy"
if Murphy did not make prompt reimbursement. Defendant
was then placed under arrest and charged with attempted
grand theft.
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The trial court, sitting without a jury, found defendant
guilty of two counts, attempt to commit grand theft and attempt to commit extortion. The sentences were to run COil-currently. Defendant appeals.
[1] "In order to establish an attempt, it must appear that
the defendant had a specific intent to commit a crime and did
a direct, unequivocal act toward that end. . . . " (People v.
Gallardo,41 Ca1.2d 57, 66 [257 P.2d 29].) [2] "Preparation alone is not enough, there must be some appreciable fragment of the crime committed [and] it must be in such progress that it will be consummated unless interrupted by
circumstances independent of the will of the attempter.... "
(People v. Buffum, 40 Ca1.2d 709, 718 [256 P.2d 317] ; see
People v. Miller, 2 Cal.2d 527, 530 [42 P.2d 308] ; People v.
Van B1lskirk, 113 Cal.App.2d 789, 792-793 [249 P.2d 49] ;
People v. Franquelin, 109 Cal.App.2d 777, 783 [241 P.2d
651] .)
[3] The evidence in the present ease is sufficient under
the foregoing rules to sustain the conviction of attempted
grand theft. Defendant's admissions to the police that he
attempted to get the $720 from Murphy by falsely representing that he could get the violations "fixed" and that the money ,
was to be for his own use, establish a specific intent to obtain
money by false pretenses. (See Pen. Code, § 484.) His conduct
in seeking to accomplish that objective went well past the
stage of "mere preparation." (See People. v. Buffum, 40 Cal.
2d 709, 718 [256 P.2d 317].) [4] After his meeting with
Murphy and his threats to secure payment of the bribe money,
the only further act necessary to consummate the crime of
grand theft was actual receipt of the money. This conduct was
unequivocal action done toward the commission of the crime
(compare People v. Wallace, 78 Ca1.App.2d 726, 742 [178 P.2d
771] ; People v. Hickman, 31 Cal.App.2d 4, 7-11 f87 P.2d 80] ;
People v . .Arbernj, 13 Cal.App. 749, 757-758 [114 P. 411]).
and is clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction of attempted
grand theft.
•
[6a] Defendant contends, however, that his actions did not
constitute an attempt to obtain money by false pretenses since
his victim was not deceived by and did not rely on the misrepresentations. It is urged that although Murphy may have
been deceived at the June 15th meeting, the direct ineffectual
act necessary to constitute an attempt did not occur until
June 18th, when defendant met Murphy to obtain the money.
It is true that at tIl at time Murphy was no longer deceived and
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that the element of lack of consent, necessary to the substantive crime of grand theft, was missing. Defendant invokes
People v. W C1"ncr, 16 Cal.2d 216 [105 P.2d 927], for the proposition that to constitute an attempted grand theft the victim
Inust be deceived by and must rely on the false representations
of the defendant. In that case, the defendant and his wife
represented to a certain McNeil, who was then awaiting trial
on grand theft charges, that they could have the charges
against him dismissed for a specified sum. McNeil disbelieved
their representations and reported the matter to the police,
who arranged to trap the defendant when the money was paid
to him. McNeil delivered a package supposedly containing the
money to the defendant's wife and she and the defendant were
then arrested. This court reversed a conviction of attempted
grand theft, stating as an alternative ground of decision: "We
are satisfied that there cannot be a theft or an att~mpted theft
of a person's property when voluntarily and without compulsion of any sort, and uninfluenced by any false or fraudulent
representations, he actively hands it over to the alleged thief
for the purpose of apprehending him as a thief or as an
attempted thief-however reprehensible the latter's intent may
be-for under such circumstances the essential element of
lack of consent is missing." (16 Cal.2d at 225.) Although
there is other authority in this state to the contrary (People v.
Wallace, 78 Cal.App.2d 726,740-742 [178 P.2d 771] ; People v.
Grossman, 28 Cal.App.2d 193, 204 [82 P.2d 76]; see also
People v. Lavine, 115 Cal.App. 289, 300 [1 P.2d 496]), the
Werner case supports defendant's position that deception of
the intended victim and his reliance on the false representations are essential elements of the offense of attempted grand
theft by false pretenses.
We are now convinced, however, that the Werner case is
unsound in so holding. It failed to recognize the crucial distinction between the completed crime of false presenses and an
attempt to commit such a crime. [6] The overwhelming weight
of authority in this country (e.g., Pcople v. Gm'dner, 144 N.Y.
119 [38 N.E. 1003] ; State v. Peterson, 109 WaSh. 25 [186 P.
264,8 A.L.R. 652] ; Williams v. State, 209 Miss. 902 [4880.2<1
598] ; State Y. Phillips, 36 Mont. 112 [92 P. 299J ; COlllmonwealth v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140 [167 A. :344] ), and in England
(e.g., Regina v. Light, 11 Crim.App.R. 111; Regina v. Hel1sle1',
11 Cox.Cr.Cas. 570; Regina v. Roebuck, 7 Cux.()r.Cas. ]26; see
89 A.L.R. 342) holds that in a prosecution for attempted
grand theft by false pretenses it is not necessary that the
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defendant's intended vict.im hI' cicrt'ived by lhr falsit.y of !l\l"'
representations made to him (Sl'C also Perkins, Criminal IJaw
489-494; Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 354-355;
Williams, Criminal Law 487-490; Miller, Criminal Law 97101; Sayre, Cl"imina~ Attempts, 41 Harv.L.&v. 821,850-855;
Keedy, Cl'imin.a~ Attempts at Common Law, 102 U.Penn.L.
Re";r. 464, 486-488).
[7] One of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect
society from those who intend to injure it. [8] When it is
established that the defendant intended to commit a specific
crime and that in carrying out this intention he committed an
act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete
the intended crime. [9] Although the law does not impose
punishment for guilty intent alone, it does impose punishment
when guilty intent is coupled with action that would result in a
crime but for the intervention of some fact or circumstance
unknown to the defendant. (See People v. Lee KOllg, 95 Cal.
666,668 [30 P. 800, 29 Am.St.Rep. 165, 17 hR.A. 626] ; Peoplc
v. Grant, 105 Cal.App.2d 347, 355-357 [233 P.2d 660].)
[5b] In the present case there was not a legal but only a
factual impossibility of consummating the intended offense,
i.e., the intended victim was not deceived. People v. Werncr,
supra, 16 Cal.2d 216, 225, is overruled and People v. Schroeder,
132 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-8 [281 P.2d 297], is disapproved to the
extent that they hold that deception of the intended victim
and his reliance on the false representations are essential elements of the offense of attempted grand theft by false pre·
tenses.
[10] Defendant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of attempted extortion is also
without merit. Section 524 of the Penal Code provides that
"every person who attempts, by means of any threat, such
as is specified in section 519 of this code, to extort money or
other property from another is punishable.... " Section 519
provides, in part, that: "Fear, such as will constitute extortion,
may be induced by a threat ... to do an unlawful injury to
the person or property of the individual threatened .... " The
record shows that at the June 18th meeting defendant stated
to Murphy that "the old man" had already paid the bribe to
the offiCials in Sacramento on Murphy's behalf and that he
would have to be reimbursed "or else." He warned: "[T] hat
is something that you have to come up with. Otherwise you arc
going to ... up your whole joint. You are going to jeopardize
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t.hc whole place. You have got to raise the money somewhere,
Bill, because that is one thing the old man won't stand for.•..
When you break your word with him you might as well fold
that ... joint." The inference is reasonable that defendant
intended" to secure money from Murphy by threatening to
procure the revocation of his license or otherwise interfere
with his business by unlawful means. The evidence supports
the implied finding that defendant attempted to place Murphy in fear of unlawful injury to his business or his person
if the money was not paid to him, and thus sustains the
conviction of attempted extortion. (Compare People v. Hopkins,105 Cal.App.2d 708, 709-710 [233 P.2d 948] ; People v.
Franquelin, 109 Cal.App.2d 777, 783-784 [241 P.2d 651]; I
see 21 Cal.Jur.2d 602,603.)
[11] Defendant contends that the two cOllvictions cannot
stand because of the provision of section 654 of the Penal Code
that CCan act or omission which is made punishable in different
ways by different provisions of this code may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under either bars a prosecution for the same act or
omission under any other.... " This section has been applied
to prohibit the double punishment of an accused not only"
where he has committed but one C Cact" in the ordinary sense,
but also "where a course of conduct violated more than one
statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible
transaction which could be punished under. more than one
statute within the meaning of section 654. Where the question
is whether a transaction is divisible or indivisible, each case
must be resolved on its facts. ' f (PeopZe v. Brown, 49 Cal.
2d 577, 591 [320 P.2d 5].) The record in the present
case discloses that defendant committed both the crime of
attempted grand theft and the crime of attempted extortion
and that his conviction for both crimes, with concurrent sentences, was proper. Defendant first tried to get $720 from
Murphy by falsely representing to him that certain'charges on !
file against his business could be "fixed" with the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board and he met with Murphy to collect
the bribe money. This conduct constituted an attempted grand
theft by false pretenses. Defendant also went further. After
realizing that he was going to encounter difficulty in securing
the $720 from Murphy, he attempted to extort the money from
Murphy by veiled threats of injury to his person or his
business. Since a "separate and distinct act [has] been

)
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established as the basis of each conviction .•. " (People v.
KROwl", 35 CaUd 175, 187 [217 P.2d 1]), the judgment on
both counts was proper. (See In. re Chapman, 43 Ca1.2d 385,
388-391 [273 P.2d 817]; People v. Slobodion, 31 Ca1.2d 555,
561-563 [191 P.2d 1] ; People v. Goodman., 159 Cal.App.2d 54,
60-62 [323 P.2d 536].)
The judgment is aftlrmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J.,
and Peters, J., concurred.
.
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